Bargaining Model on the Plane (Algorithmic and Computational Theory in Algebra and Languages) by Mazalov, Vladimir V. & Tokareva, Julia S.
Title Bargaining Model on the Plane (Algorithmic andComputational Theory in Algebra and Languages)
Author(s)Mazalov, Vladimir V.; Tokareva, Julia S.




Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Textversionpublisher
Kyoto University
Bargaining Model on the Plane
Vladimir V. Mazalov
Institute of Applied Mathematical Research
Karelian Research Center of Russian Academy of Sciences
Pushkinskaya str. 11, Petrozavodsk 185910, Russia
e-mail: vmazalov@krc.karelia.ru
Julia S. Tokareva
Zabaikalsky State Humanitarian Pedagogical University
named after N.Tchernishevsky
Babushkin str. 129, Chita 672007,Russia
e-mail: jtokareva2@mail.ru
Abstact
Non-coalition non-zero-sum game related with arbitration procedure is considered. Two players
(firlns) propose $\backslash SOI\iota\iota e$ solutions on the plane. The arbtrator has his own solution which is inod-elling by random variables in the circle on the plane. As a solution of the conflict we use here thefinal offer arbitration procedure (FOA). The objective is the construction of Nash equilibrium. Fortwo cases of thc random solution of the arbitrator we found the equilibrium in pure stratcgics.
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1 Introduction
Imagine the market where two different firms (players I and II) propose their expected
costs for the building construction. The administration have choose one proposal. The
first firm can build the building with cost $x_{1}$ for the timc $y_{1}$ and second firm-with
cost $x_{2}$ and time $y_{2}$ .
$Let_{l}$ the solution of the arbitrator is random variable $z$ distributed in the unit circle
with probablility density in polar coordinates $f(r, \theta)$ . The objective of the players is
to receive the order for the building.
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2 Solution of the game
Let the point $(x_{1\backslash }y_{1})$ on the plane corresponds to the offer of the player I and $(x_{2}, y_{2})$
corresponds to the offer II and $A$ is the solution of the arbitrator. The arbitrator prefers
a firm which is closer to the point $A$ .
Let us divide the circle for two parts $s_{1}$ and $s_{2}$ . The first part consists of the points
of the circle the distance from which to the point $(x_{1}, y_{1})$ is smaler than to the point
$(x_{2_{j}}y_{2})$ . The second part is opposite case.
Fig. 1
Then the payoffs of the firms I and II are
$H_{1}(r_{1}, \theta_{1}, r_{2}\eta\theta_{2})=h_{1}(r_{1}, \theta_{1})\cdot\mu(S_{1})$ ,
$H_{2}(r_{1}, \theta_{\rceil}, r_{2}, \theta_{2})=h_{2}(r_{2}, \theta_{2})\cdot\mu(S_{2})=h_{2}(r_{2}, \theta_{2})\cdot(1-\mu(S_{1}))$ , (1)
wherc
$\mu(S_{i})=\int_{s}f(r_{7}\theta)drd\theta$ is the probablity measure of $S_{i}$ ,
$r_{j}$ is radius-vector of the point $(x_{j}, \uparrow\int i)$ ,
$\theta_{i}$ is the angle between $Ox$ and radius-vector $r_{i}$ ,
$h_{i}(r_{i}, \theta_{i})$ is payoff of the i-th firm if her proposal is closer to the arbitrator solution.
Let us find Nash equilibrium in this game. We find it from the conditions
$\frac{\partial H_{1}}{\partial r_{1}}=\frac{\partial H_{2}}{\partial r_{2}}=0$,
where
$\frac{\partial H_{i}}{\partial r_{t}}=\frac{\partial h_{i}(r_{i},\theta_{i})}{\partial r_{i}}\cdot\mu(S_{i})+\frac{\partial\mu(S_{i})}{\partial r_{i}}\cdot h_{i}(r_{i}, \theta_{i})$ . (2)
Consider two different cases of distribution of the arbitrator.
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3 Distribution of the \dagger \dagger center\dagger \dagger type
Let the distribution density of random variables $z$ in polar coordinates has form:
$f(r, \theta)=\frac{3(1-r)}{\pi}$ . (3)
Consider the payoffs when the first firm maximises the first coordinate and the second
firm-second coordinate.




Calculate the measure of $S_{2}$ . Denote
$R= \frac{r^{\frac{)}{\underline\prime y}}-r^{\frac{‘)}{1}}}{2\sqrt{r_{2}^{2}+r_{1}^{2}}}$ .
We obtain
$\mu(S_{2})=2_{arcsi}/_{nR}^{/2}\pi d\theta_{\frac{1^{1}R}{si_{11}\theta}}r\frac{3(1-r)}{\pi}dr=\frac{6}{\pi}(\frac{\pi}{12}-\frac{1}{6}$ arcsin $R+ \frac{R^{3}}{12}\ln|1+\sqrt{1-R^{2}}|-$
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$- \frac{R^{3}}{12}\ln|1-\sqrt{1-R^{2}}|-\frac{R}{3}\sqrt{1-R^{2}}$ (5 )
Consequently, the payoffs of players have the form:
$H_{1}=r_{1}( \frac{1}{2}+\frac{1}{\pi}$ arcsin $R- \frac{R^{3}}{2\pi}$ In $|1+\sqrt{1-R^{2}}|+$
$+ \frac{R^{3},}{2\pi}\ln|1-\sqrt{1-R^{2}}|+\frac{2R}{\pi}\sqrt{1-R^{2}}$ ,
$H_{2}=r_{2}( \frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{\pi}$ arcsin $R+ \frac{R^{3}}{2\pi}\ln|1+\sqrt{1-R^{2}}|-$
$- \frac{R^{3}}{2\pi}\ln|1-\sqrt{1-R^{2}}|-\frac{2R}{\pi}\sqrt{1-R^{2}}$ (6)
Differentiating the first function in $r_{1}$ and second function in $r_{2}$ we obtain
$\frac{\partial H_{1}}{\partial r_{1}}=\frac{1}{2}+\frac{1}{\pi}$ arcsin $R- \frac{R^{3}}{2\pi}$ In $|1+ \sqrt{1-R^{2}}|+\frac{R^{3}}{2\pi}$ in $|1-\sqrt{1-R^{2}}|+$
$+ \frac{2R}{\pi}\sqrt{1-R^{2}}+\frac{3r_{1}}{2\pi}$ $(2\sqrt{1-R^{2}}R_{r_{1}}’+R^{2}\cdot R_{r_{1}}’$ . in $|1-\sqrt{1-R^{2}}|)$ ,
$\frac{\partial H_{2}}{\partial r_{2}}=\frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{\pi}$ arcsin $R+ \frac{R^{3}}{2\pi}$ In $|1+ \sqrt{1-R^{2}}|-\frac{R^{3}}{2\pi}$ In $|1-\sqrt{1-R^{2}}|-$




Symmetry of the problem yields $r_{1}=r_{2}$ hence,
$R=0,$ $R_{r_{1}}’.=- \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}=-R_{r_{2}}’$ .
It follows
$\frac{\partial H_{1}}{\partial r_{1}}r_{2}=r_{1}=\frac{1}{2}-\frac{3r_{1}}{\sqrt{2}\pi}$ ,







$\theta_{1}=0,$ $x_{1}= \frac{\sqrt{2}\pi}{6},$ $y_{1}=0$ ,
$\theta_{2}=\frac{\pi}{2},$ $x_{2}=0,$ $y_{2}= \frac{\sqrt{2}\pi}{6}$ . (9)
Find the second derivative of the function $H_{1}$ :
$H_{l_{r_{I}r_{1}}}’’= \frac{3}{\pi}(2\sqrt{1-R^{2}}\cdot R_{\tau_{1}}’.+R^{2}\cdot R_{71}’\cdot\ln|1-\sqrt{1-R^{2}}|)+$
$+ \frac{3r_{1}}{2\pi}(2R\cdot(R’)^{2}\cdot\ln|1-\sqrt{1-R^{2}}|+R^{2}\cdot R_{r_{1}r_{1}}’’\cdot\ln|1-\sqrt{1-R^{2}}|-$
$-R \cdot(R’)^{2}\frac{1-\sqrt{1-R^{2}}}{\sqrt{1-R^{2}}}$ (10)
For $r_{1}=r_{2}$ we obtain
$H_{1_{r_{1}r_{1}}}’’= \frac{-6}{\pi\sqrt{2}}<0$ .
Consequently, $r_{1}= \frac{\sqrt{2}\pi}{6}$ is the local maximum of $H_{1}$ . Analogously, $H”,<0$ and for
$r_{2}= \frac{\sqrt{2}\pi}{6}$ the function $H_{2}$ achieves the maximum.
The expected payoff is equal to
$H= \frac{\sqrt{2}\pi}{12}$ .
4 Distribution of the $1\uparrow$ center and seaside“ type
Let now the distribution density has form
$f(r,$ $\theta)=a+\frac{3}{2}(\pi^{-1}-a)r$ , (11)
where $a$ is some parameter. Consider the case when the first firm is interested to







$x_{2}-y_{2}=r_{2} \cos(-\frac{\pi}{4})+r_{2}\sin(-\frac{\pi}{4})=\sqrt{2}r_{2}$ , (13)
give the payoffs of the form
$H_{2}=2/0^{\arccos^{z_{\overline{2}}\perp}1}/_{2co6}rA^{\wedge}r_{\theta}\lrcorner dr\cdot rr-r_{d\theta}$ . $(a+ \frac{3}{2}(\pi^{-1}-a)r)\cdot\sqrt{2}r_{2}=$
$= \sqrt{2}r_{2}[\frac{1}{\pi}$ arccos $\frac{r_{2}-r_{1}}{2}-\frac{1}{32}(\frac{1}{\pi}-a)(r_{2}-r_{1})^{3}\ln\frac{2+\sqrt{4-(\gamma_{2}-r}\overline{1)^{2}}}{2-\sqrt{4-(r_{2}-r_{1}}\overline{)^{2}}}+$
$+ \frac{1}{8}(\frac{1}{\pi}-a)(r_{2}-r_{1})\sqrt{4-(r_{2}-r_{1})^{2}}]$ ,
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$H_{1}= \sqrt{2}r_{1}[1-\frac{1}{\pi}$ arccos $\frac{r_{2}-r_{1}}{2}+\frac{1}{32}(\frac{1}{\pi}-a)(7_{2^{-}}r_{1})^{3}\ln|\frac{2+\sqrt{4-(r_{2}-r_{1})^{2}}}{2-\sqrt{4-(r_{2}-r_{1})^{2}}}|-$
$- \frac{1}{8}(\frac{1}{\pi}-a)(r_{2}-r_{1})\sqrt{4-(r_{2}-r_{1})^{2}}]$ . (14)
Calculate the partial derivative $\frac{\partial}{\partial}r_{i}H\lrcorner$ and let it is equal to zero:








$r_{i}= \frac{2\pi}{1+\pi a}$ .
From here we obtain
$\theta_{1}=\frac{3\pi}{4},$ $x_{1}=- \frac{\sqrt{2}\pi}{1+\pi a},$ $y_{1}= \frac{\sqrt{2}\pi}{1+\pi a}$ ,
$\theta_{2}=-\frac{\pi}{4})x_{2}=\frac{\sqrt{2}\pi}{1+\pi a},$ $y_{2}=- \frac{\sqrt{2}\pi}{1+\pi a}$ . (16)
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The expected payoff of the firm is equal to
$H= \frac{\sqrt{2}\pi}{1+\pi 0}$ .
The condition $r\geq 0$ gives the restriction for $a$ as $a>- \frac{1}{\pi}$ . In the table you find the
values of $r$ for some $a$ .
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